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  1. Events by cover
  2. Bougainville campaign
  3. Upcoming V-E Day Commemorative Events
  4. World War II Links on the Internet

Army, a school in coalition warfare and an introduction to enemy tactics.

Events by cover

Both volumes emphasize the influence of logistical support on the planning and conduct of combat operations by field armies. Army in Normandy to 1 July Army from 1 July through 10 September and of the Third U.

Army from 1 August through 31 August , including the "battle of the hedgerows," the Mortain counterattack, the reduction of Brest, and the liberation of Paris. In detailing these campaigns, Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith focus on the operational level of war from August to early , paying special attention not only to the problems of joint, combined, and special operations but also to the significant roles of logistics, intelligence, and personnel policies. The fact that Clarke and Smith analyze these concepts in such detail makes their volume an invaluable reference source for today's military commanders and junior officers.

Army activities in the Near East in support of the aid-to-Russia supply program, with a discussion of the problems faced by Allies who met in strange lands without tested and well-coordinated policies to govern their diplomatic and military relations. An appendix looks at German medical service in the African and European areas covered by the volume. The search for greater mobility and increased firepower is described, as well as the development of guns, rockets, and bombs. The development of radar is featured, as well as the development of frequency modulation and its impact on the use of tanks.

CMH Pub - The Transportation Corps- Movements, Training, and Supply Troop and supply movements within the zone of interior and to overseas commands, the organization and training of personnel, and the development, procurement, and distribution of Corps materiel. Graham A. Cosmas and Albert E.

Bougainville campaign

Cowdrey ably describe how the military medical system organized, trained, and deployed; how hospitals were built and supplies assembled and moved forward; and how casualties were treated and evacuated from the field of battle. The volume supports the proposition that the experience of medical personnel in war directly stimulates advances in medical science.

Ken Burns on the Second World War.

The principles of medical organization remain of vital importance, the exploits of the doctors, corpsmen, and medical support units providing a model for the planning and organization of medical support in today's Army. Cowdrey describe how the Army's senior medical officers pooled their talents with the scientific knowledge of the day and overcame vast distances, diverse climates, logistical problems, and rapidly changing circumstances to support and maintain the strength of troops fighting in remote disease-ridden environments.

In the course of the war against Japan, these dedicated professionals realized significant advances in military medicine, developing new drugs and techniques for preventing and controlling disease, fielding hospitals and units uniquely equipped to support jungle and island fighting, and perfecting amphibious medical support. Flexible organization, ingenuity, and the latest scientific advances helped medical personnel to support infantry combat teams on isolated islands or in dense jungles, to prevent and control disease, to adapt medical care for amphibious operations, and to treat and evacuate casualties over difficult terrain and then by sea or air.

  1. Manual of Allergy and Immunology.
  2. . . . And a Few Marines: Marines in the Liberation of the Philippines (Turning Point)?

The study concludes with an analysis of the partially integrated service of black infantry platoons on the European front in the last months of the war. The common effort ranged from growing wheat to the climactic development of the atomic bomb. Long out of print, this facsimile edition contains not only MacArthur's own perspective of his operations against the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II but also the enemy's unique account of Imperial Army campaigns against MacArthur's forces.

Collectively, the reports have substantial and enduring value for military historians and students of military affairs, providing an illuminating record of momentous events influenced in large measure by a distinguished Soldier and towering figure in American historiography. Topics include strategy and tactics, partisan and psychological warfare, coalition warfare, and manpower and production problems faced by both countries. THE U. Army's concepts of armored warfare grew from a platform focus and a narrowly defined mission into a broad capability.

Through analysis of the Armor Branch's early years, the book provides an excellent case study in force transformation. The development of new armor doctrines and organizations to exploit emerging technologies, concepts, and missions is the heart of this work. Army and World War II is an anthology of selected papers from three international conferences held in , , and on the Army's role in the war. Taking the best from those meetings, Judith L.

Bellafaire has organized the various presentations into four thematic categories-prewar planning, the home front, the European theater, and the Asian-Pacific theaters-reflecting the diversity of both the war and the interest of those seeking to understand its many facets. In these carefully edited papers, one will find the more conventional treatments of doctrine, strategy, and operations side by side with those focusing on military mobilization and procurement, race and gender, psychological warfare, and large-scale advice and assistance programs.

Those grappling with the challenges of stability operations and other contingency missions in support of the Global War on Terrorism will find this collection of readings invaluable. For the amphibious assault vessels and supporting warships, the main threat came from Japanese land-based kamikaze suicide planes. The Japanese had begun the practice as a desperate measure during the final stages of the Leyte Campaign, perfecting it during December. On the 13th, two days before the scheduled assault on Mindoro, the light.

Among the injured was Brig. William C. Dunkel, commander of the landing force. Later kamikaze attacks damaged two landing ships, tank LSTs and disabled several other ships. Army and Navy aviation did what they could during the first weeks of December. The Army claimed to have destroyed about Japanese planes in the air and on the ground throughout the Philippines and the Navy more. The invasion of Mindoro began on 15 December. Clear weather allowed full use of U. The ensuing landings were also unopposed. With only about 1, Japanese troops on the large island, plus some survivors from ships sunk off Mindoro while on their way to Leyte, the defenders could do little.

By the end of the first day, Army engineers were hard at work preparing airfields for the invasion of Luzon. The first was completed in five days; a second was ready in thirteen.

World War II: The War in the Air - Full Documentary

Together the airfields allowed American aircraft to provide more direct. From his headquarters in Manila, General Yamashita realized that he could expect little outside support. The Japanese naval and air arms had done their best in the preceding months but to no avail, and they had been largely destroyed in the process. Moreover, Yamashita's forces on Luzon, some , strong, were weak in artillery, transport, armor, and other modern equipment. They would be unable to face the well-equipped American Army units in open warfare.

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Thus Yamashita decided to fight a delaying action, keeping his army in the field as long as possible. During his defense of the Philippines, MacArthur had considered Manila, the central Luzon plains, and the Bataan Peninsula critical, with their harbors and airfields. The Japanese commander, however, had no intention of defending these sites. Instead, Yamashita planned to withdraw the bulk of his forces into three widely separated mountain strongholds and settle down for a long battle of attrition.

Long before the American invasion began, General Yamashita divided his Luzon forces into three groups, each centered around a remote geographical region. The largest of these groups and under the direct command of Yamashita was Shobu Group, located in northern Luzon with about , troops. A much smaller force, Kembu Group, with approximately 30, troops, occupied the Clark Air Field complex as well as the Bataan Peninsula and Corridor.

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The third major force, Shimbu Group, consisted of some 80, soldiers occupying the southern sections of Luzon, an area that included the island's long Bicol Peninsula as well as the mountains immediately east of Manila. Most Shimbu units were in the latter area and controlled the vital reservoirs that provided most of the capital area's water supply. On the American side, General MacArthur intended to strike first at Lingayen Gulf, an area of sheltered beaches on the northwestern coast of Luzon.

A landing there would place his troops close to the best roads and railways on the island, all of which ran through the central plains south to Manila, his main objective. Also, by landing that far north of the capital, MacArthur allowed himself maneuvering room for the large force he intended to use on Luzon. But once the beachhead was secure, his initial effort would focus on a southern drive to the Filipino capital. Possession of this central core, as well as Manila Bay, would allow his forces to dominate the island and make a further coordinated defense by the Japanese exceedingly difficult.

Ultimately ten U. The weather on 9 January called S-day was ideal. A light overcast dappled the predawn sky, and gentle waves promised a smooth ride onto the beach. At the pre-assault bombardment began and was followed an hour later by the landings. With little initial Japanese opposition, General Krueger's Sixth Army landed almost , men along a twenty-mile beachhead within a few days. While the I Corps, commanded by Lt. Innis P. Swift, protected the beachhead's flanks, Lt. Oscar W. Only after the Manila area had been secured was Swift's I Corps to push north and east to seize the vital road junctions leading from the coast into the mountains of northern Luzon.

Almost from the beginning there was friction between MacArthur and some of his subordinates. Already, he pointed out, I Corps had encountered opposition on the beachhead's northern, or left, flank, while the XIV Corps had found little resistance to the south. Cautious, Krueger hesitated before committing his army to a narrow thrust directly toward Manila with his eastern flank open to a possible Japanese attack.

MacArthur disagreed. He thought it unlikely that the Japanese were capable of mounting an attack in Sixth Army's rear or flank and directed Krueger to follow his prearranged plans, seizing Clark Air Field and the port facilities at Manila as soon as possible. But with Yamashita's Shobu Group relatively inactive, Krueger's concerns proved unwarranted.

As at the beachhead, the Japanese put up little opposition to the drive south, having evacuated the central plains earlier. Only when Griswold's troops reached the outskirts of Clark Field on 23 January did they run up against determined resistance, and it came from the relatively weak Kembu Group. For more than a week the Japanese fought a stubborn battle against the advancing Americans, and it was not until the end of January that the airfield was in American hands.

Leaving the 40th Division behind to occupy the area, Krueger regrouped the XIV Corps and on 2 February continued south toward the capital. From the beginning, MacArthur remained unhappy with the pace of the advance.

  1. Introduction to the liberation of Luzon, 1945.
  2. World War II: Philippines Campaign, Battle for Luzon.
  3. . . . And a Few Marines: Marines in the Liberation of the Philippines (Sources).

He personally drove up and down the advancing line,. At the same time MacArthur added additional forces to the drive on the capital. Joseph M.